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This paper, a case study of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), sheds 
new insights into the role of the U.S. State in innovation. The study uses grounded theory-
building methods to unpack the processes by which DARPA fosters new technology trajectories 
within the institutional ecosystem supporting the computing industry. At the heart of the paper 
are 50 in-depth field interviews of DARPA program managers and related microsystems 
technologists within start-ups, universities, government institutions, and the five established 
computing firms. Going further, the paper triangulates this qualitative interview data with 
participant observation, archival data, and bibliometric data to provide a holistic view of the 
forces driving technological change.  The results find DARPA to be a uniquely adaptive 
organization.  Yet, throughout such adaptations, DARPA program managers use the same five-
step process to influence technology. With its latest shift, DARPA may be effectively (1) 
narrowing the valley of death, (2) coordinating innovation within a vertically fragmented 
industry, and (3) influencing innovation to serve military needs despite primary demand being in 
commercial applications.  This “new DARPA” may, however, leave the U.S. technology pipeline 
without new sources. 
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Are you familiar with the allegory of the cave? (Plato, The Republic) … it’s the same thing (with 
trying to deduce technology directions from) funding.  The technology direction is a separate 
thing.  
– Lead technologist, Government Lab. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With more and more jobs moving overseas, there has been rising concern over the ability 
of the U.S. to remain competitive in the global economy.  In 2006, a committee from the 
National Academy of Sciences found a common “disturbing picture” across a multitude of 
industries, specifically, “a recurring pattern of abundant short-term thinking and insufficient 
long-term investment.” Key among their recommendations was to “strengthen the nation’s 
traditional commitment to long-term basic research that has the potential to maintain… the flow 
of new ideas that fuel the economy”(NationalAcademies, 2006). 
The committee’s recommendations are not surprising. In the earlier part of the 20th 
century, much R&D was still housed within corporate laboratories such as Bell Laboratories, GE 
Research, and Xerox Parc. In the 80s and 90s, with the rise of industrial clusters around Rt. 128 
and Silicon Valley, research emerged suggesting key advantages to networked small and 
medium sized enterprises. Such enterprises were shown to be able to react more quickly to 
changing business environments, and to be more innovative than their larger, slower-moving 
counterparts (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Pavitt and Townsend, 1987; Powell, 1990). Today, many 
large firms outsource their innovation needs to universities and small firms through technology 
alliances and acquisitions (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lamb and Spekman, 1997; Chesbrough, 
2003). 
This industrial model may have disadvantages for long-term innovation. Although often 
more flexible and innovative, small and medium sized firms also have fewer resources.  With 
skills in China and India improving, firms can now manufacture offshore early in the innovation 
process.  Recent research suggests that with high cost pressures, such firms may have incentives 
to produce low-tech products offshore rather than to invest in innovations critical to long-term 
markets (Fuchs, 2005). Additional studies have demonstrated challenges in this new environment 
in the alignment of firm incentives (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie), in coordination across 
firms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti and Levien, 2004), and in supporting long-term 
research (Macher et al., 2000). Thus, while individual firms’ decisions in this environment may 
be optimal for their short-term survival, the consequences for the broader innovation ecosystem 
and for U.S. long-term innovation remain uncertain. Understanding to what extent and in what 
form government policies may be necessary to support long-term innovation in this new 
environment may be critical to maintaining national competitiveness. 
To shed insights into this question, this study focuses on the Defense Advance Research 
Projects Association (DARPA) – a pioneer of the methods used by the U.S. developmental 
network state (Block, 2007) and one of the agencies to achieve some of the most striking early 
successes in technology development (NRC, 1999). Several factors make today a particularly 
interesting time to study DARPA.  First, while DARPA has historically enjoyed significant 
success in introducing and commercializing new technologies, DARPA has under the 
directorship of Tony Tether (2001-present) undergone momentous changes. These changes have 
faced significant criticism from the academic computing community (JointStatement, 2005; 
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Lazowska and Patterson, 2005). Given the recent shift of DARPA funding away from academia 
to established industry vendors, (Markoff, 2005) this criticism is not surprising. Second, leading 
up to this shift within DARPA, there have been significant changes in the industry structure, 
market structure, and R&D structure in computing.  It is unclear whether the changes within 
DARPA are a necessary adjustment to changes in the computing industry and its innovation 
ecosystem. Finally, in the last decade a wealth of organizations have sprung up copying DARPA 
and aimed at technology development for other communities, outside the Department of 
Defense.  The most obvious examples include Advanced Research and Development Activity 
(ARDA, 1998) -- later renamed the Disruptive Technology Office (DTO) -- for the intelligence 
community; HSARPA (2002) for homeland security; IARPA (2006) again for the intelligence 
community, and into which the DTO’s activities were folded; and ARPA-E (2007) which 
although it has not yet received funding in the U.S. budget, is meant for the Department of 
Energy.  With the recent development of these organizations, it seems important to step back and 
look at the processes by which DARPA, historically, has encouraged new technology 
developments; what, over the years, about DARPA has changed and what has remained constant; 
and, most importantly, how these processes are working in today’s innovation ecosystem. 
The results of this study suggest three main findings: First, DARPA’s ability to change with 
changing political, environmental, and technical times is a critical strategic asset enabled by the 
structure of the organization. Second, regardless of organizational changes in DARPA, DARPA 
program managers continue to use five processes to seed and encourage new technology 
trajectories with the academic and industrial communities. This processes consists of (1) 
facilitating conversations among similar researchers by bringing them together to brainstorm on 
technology directions, (2) gathering momentum around key ideas by providing seed funding to 
disparate researchers working on similar projects, (3) disseminating knowledge and creating 
community by bringing funded researchers together in research workshops to discuss their 
results, and (4) acting as third party validation of new technology directions to latter-stage 
funding agencies (like NSF) and to industry, and (5) not sustaining the technology. Third, 
although the focus of DARPA’s efforts over the past seven years have shifted from universities 
to collaborations across universities, government labs, and industry, and despite significant 
criticism from the academic community, DARPA may be doing a good job at (1) narrowing the 
valley of death, (2) coordinating innovation within a vertically fragmented industry, and (3) 
influencing technology development to still serve military needs despite primary demand for 
computing having moved into commercial applications.  Finally, despite these potential strengths 
of the recent shifts within DARPA in the current innovation ecosystem, in focusing on “bridging 
the gap” from invention to innovation, DARPA may have left the technology pipeline without 
new sources of innovation. 
 
2. Previous Research: Networks of Innovators and the Role for the State 
2.1. Changes in the U.S. Innovation Ecosystem: Networks of Innovators 
Today, complex networks of firms, universities, and government labs are critical features of 
many industries, especially in fields with rapid technological progress, such as computers, 
semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology (Powell and Grodal, 2005). This complex 
ecosystem of innovators has only become commonplace over the past two decades (Powell and 
Grodal, 2005). A National Research Council assessment of eleven US-based industries observes 
in every sector an increased reliance on external sources of R&D, notably universities, consortia, 
and government labs, and greater collaboration with domestic and foreign competitors, as well as 
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customers in the development of new products and processes (Mowery, 1999). The National 
Science Foundation data show a marked increase by the mid-1990s in the formation rates for 
international alliances linking US firms with their domestic competitors. These collaborations 
were motivated largely by concerns with the development of new technologies. There are also 
growing links between US firms and universities, and greater involvement by firms and 
government labs in research joint ventures. As a consequence, (Mowery, 1999) observes, “the 
diversity of institutional actors and relationships in the industrial innovation process has 
increased considerably.” 
With increased linkages and diversity of institutional actors in industrial innovation, there has 
been growing interest in how technology directions evolve and are coordinated across these 
institutional boundaries. At the firm level, driving this need for coordination has been the 
increasing vertical disintegration and fragmentation of production (Gereffi et al., 2005). In 
response, the business strategy literature has begun exploring firm ecosystems and the 
technological interdependencies among firms (Moore, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner, 
2006). This ecosystem construct raises a new set of issues for both researchers and managers to 
consider.  Such issues include joint development incentives (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 
2005), options for positional leadership and coordination (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti 
and Levien, 2004), the timing of resource commitments (Almeida et al., 2006), the recalibration 
of customer expectations (Adner, 2006; Tripsas, 2006), and the evolution of industry 
architectures (Jabcobides, 2005). Research to-date has explored the challenges that arise when 
incentives across the ecosystem are not aligned (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 2005), the role 
of ecosystem partners in shaping firm’s abilities and incentives to compete for different market 
segments (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995), and the activities that focal firms undertake to 
induce partners to favor their specific technology platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). 
Research has also explored when alliances promote increased interfirm knowledge transfers 
versus specialization (Macher and Mowery, 2004).  The business strategy literature, however, 
has failed to explore the role, if any, government may need to play in addressing coordination 
problems and market failures within this.  Particularly at risk within this vertically fragmented 
ecosystem may be long-term technology development incentives (Macher et al., 2000). 
The answer to this cross-firm coordination challenge may in part come from a second literature 
on technological change – the literature on individual social networks (in contrast to the above 
literature on networks of firms).  While the business strategy literature has focused on the 
technological interdependencies among firms and how firms evolve technological platforms, the 
emerging literature on networks of innovators has focused on individuals and how their 
interpersonal networks influence technology trajectories. This research has explored how inter-
organizational networks and communities socially construct technology cycles; and, in reverse, 
how technological outcomes determine the evolution of these organizations and communities 
(Van de Ven and Garud, 1989; Powell, 1990; Nelson, 1994; Van de Ven and Garud, 1994; 
Bijker, 1995; Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998). According to this literature, knowledge flows 
within social networks are influenced (1) by the type of ties – strong versus weak (Granovetter, 
1973); (2) by the type of knowledge flowing across those ties – tacit (Nonaka, 1991) versus 
codified (Zander and Kogut, 1995), standardization, stickiness (VonHippel, 1994), ambiguity 
(Szulanski, 1996), and complexity (Hansen, 1999; Sorenson et al., 2006); (3) by the type of 
node, (4) by the relational proximity between nodes – including common identity and language, 
similarities between scientists (Song et al., 2003), and communities of practice (Brown 1991); 
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(5) by geographic proximity (Allen, 1977; Teece, 1977; Mansfield et al., 1982; Saxenian, 1994; 
Porter, 2001); and (6) by labor markets (Azoulay, 2003).1  
The social networks which influence technological change can be both formal and informal. 
Formal social networks can include, task forces (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998), standards 
bodies (Miller 1995; West 2000), and roadmapping institutions (Kappel, 2001). Informal 
knowledge-sharing and alliances have been shown to occur among engineers in close geographic 
proximity (Allen, 1977), among engineers within the same region (Saxenian, 1994) as well as 
among engineers within rival firms (Allen, 1983; VonHippel, 1987).  Regardless of whether this 
information sharing is occurring within formal task forces or informally over beers, research has 
discussed in the previous paragraph, social networks can lead knowledge at times to flow more-
easily between people across firm boundaries, than people within the boundaries of a single firm.  
Despite the significance of individual social networks in influencing innovation, little is 
understood about the role, if any, of the state within this social framework, and how this social 
framework may interact within the broader firm and ecosystem incentives to enable the 
coordination of technological change. 
2.2. Industrial Policy in the United States 
Debates on the appropriate role for the state in science and technology development are as 
real today as they were 232 years ago, when Adam Smith first wrote about the invisible hand in 
the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776).  Today, authors continue to promote the benefits of free 
markets, from Milton and Friedman’s Free to Choose (Friedman and Friedmand, 1980), which 
argues against the need for the National Science Foundation, to Arora and Alfonso’s Market’s 
For Technology (Arora et al., 2001), which suggests that a combination of patent law and the 
vertical fragmentation of firm boundaries enables a free market for ideas. Despite this free 
market ideology, there is a long history of the U.S. government using innovation and industrial 
policies to help ensure technological upgrading and the transfer of inventions into commercial 
products (Block, 2007). In his classic history of U.S. industrial policy, Graham argues that a 
leading problem with the U.S. government’s developmental policies have been their lack of 
coordination (Graham, 1992).  He notes that under Keynesian thought, “economic policy meant 
manipulating spending and taxation, money, and credit.   The government’s function was to 
influence the volume, not the direction, of investment” (Graham, 1992)  Block argues that this 
lack of an explicit developmental policy – defined here as a policy of the government picking 
technology winners – in the U.S. is due to market fundamentalism forcing existing 
developmental initiatives to remain largely hidden from public discussion (Block, 2007).  
Recently, however, Atkinson and Wial have attempted to start a public discussion, echoing 
Graham in their call for a National Innovation Foundation to coordinate the activities of the 
fragmented technology development organizations in the United States (Atkinson and Wial, 
2008).  Also bringing the potential role of the U.S. State in choosing technology winner into 
recent public discussion, Office of Science and Technology Policy in their report, “The Science 
of Science Policy: A Federal Research Roadmap,” call for metrics and better modeling 
techniques to help U.S. bureaucrats in making technical investments (Valdez and Lane, 2008).  
Recent research, however, suggests that rather than central coordination or better-tooled 
bureaucrats, there may be another alternative to better-informed science and technology 
investment, with existing examples already functioning quite well within the United States.  This 
                                                
1 For a review of the literature which suggests many of the above categories see (Argote, McEvily, Reagans 2003). 
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alternative is the Developmental Network State. 
Developmental policies have recently been broken into two categories – the Developmental 
Bureaucratic State and the Developmental Network State (O'Riain, 2004; Block, 2007). The 
Developmental Bureaucratic State typically uses top-down polices involving government-based 
research and firm subsidies to develop local expertise in targeted industries, and help firms invest 
in upgrading (Kim, 1997; Amsden, 2001; Breznitz, 2007). The most prominent Developmental 
Bureaucratic States are developing countries. As skills develop, these countries move from 
policies promoting imitation to promoting local innovation.  While a centralized developmental 
state is feasible in developing countries, this role becomes more difficult when there is no 
international leader that firms can imitate, and uncertainty as to what will be the long-term 
technological winners is high (Block, 2007) Many developed countries – in particular the U.S. 
and Western Europe – instead have a Developmental Network State.  In contrast to the 
Developmental Bureaucratic State, the Developmental Network State involves public sector 
officials working closely with firms to identify and support the most promising avenues for 
innovation (Block, 2007).  These public sector officials, in promoting innovation, execute four 
overlapping tasks – providing resources to target areas, opening windows for scientists and 
engineers to bring and receive support for new ideas, brokering – i.e. connecting different groups 
(both technologist-to-technologist and technologist-to-business) so they can take advantage of 
each other’s knowledge, and facilitation – i.e. creating standards, infrastructure, and regulation to 
ease the introduction of the new technology.  To successfully execute these tasks, the public 
officials must be deeply rooted in the technological community they are funding, and have the 
embedded autonomy to act on their knowledge (Block, 2007).  This networked nature of the 
DNS is particularly significant given the increased vertical disintegration of innovative activities 
and increased linkages across organization-types and researchers involved in innovative 
activities in recent years in the United States.  The embedded autonomy of the Developmental 
Network State bureaucrats is critical to the State maintaining flexibility to changing technical, 
political, and economic times.  The existing literature on the Developmental Network State, 
however, is primarily theoretical (the empirical work is on Ireland), and leaves little insights into 
how an organization which is part of a Developmental Network State might be formulated and 
what processes this organization’s bureaucrats should use to successfully gain momentum 
around new technology directions.  This paper focuses on the pioneer of the U.S. Developmental 
Network State – DARPA. 
 
3. Organizational Background: The Changing Faces of DARPA 
 
“The only constant is change.”  Laertius, Diogenes.  Lives of the Philsophers. 
 
An often overlooked asset of DARPA as an organization is its ability to shift with the political 
and economic environment of the times. This paper brings a magnifying glass to on one such 
shift within DARPA’s history – DARPA’s shift from a focus on U.S. international 
competitiveness under directors Gary Denman, Larry Lynn, and Frank Fernandez in the 1990s, 
to a focus on “bridging the gap” between nascent ideas and commercial (military or industrial) 
application.  This shift, which was led by DARPA’s 18th director, Tony Tether (2001-2008), has 
drawn significant criticism, from both academic and industrial communities in computing as a 
move which abandons the “old DARPA.”  Looking at DARPA’s history, however, it is unclear 
precisely what that “old DARPA” might be.  As can be seen in Table 1, the political and 
Table 1: The Changing Face of DARPA: A Historical Chronology of the Organization 
Decade 1958 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Name ARPA (’58-72) DARPA (’72-93) ARPA (’93-96) DARPA (‘96-08) 
Era  Basic Research Military Missions Industry Focus Competitiveness, 
Internationalization 
Industry to Military 
President Eisenhower 
(‘53-61) 
Eisenhower (‘53-61) 
Kennedy (‘61-63) 
Johnson (‘63-69) 
Nixon (‘69-74) 
Ford (‘74-77) 
Carter (‘77-81) 
Reagan (‘81-89) Bush (‘89-93) 
Clinton (‘93-01) 
Bush Jr. (‘01-08) 
Legislative/ 
Political 
Environment 
Cold War 
Sputnik (‘57) 
Cold War 
Vietnam War (‘59-75) 
Cold War 
Vietnam War (‘59-75)  
Mansfield Act (‘69) 
 
Cold War Ends 
Star Wars 
Noyce -more VC (‘78) 
Concern about 
competitiveness 
against Japan; 
National Cooperative 
Research Act (‘84) 
Field forced to leave 
due to excessive 
industrial focus (‘90); 
Sematech desires 
internationalization, 
weans from public 
assistance (‘95); 
DARPA criticized for 
slow transition to 
military (’97); 
Increased inter-
organizational and  
international R&D 
linkages 
World Trade Center 
Attacked (Sept. 11, 
2001); Bush Jr. enters 
Iraq (‘03); Increased 
concerns about U.S. 
competitiveness, 
especially against 
India, China (Rising 
Above the Gathering 
Storm 2005); Criticism 
of DARPA for not 
funding basic R&D 
(Lazowski House 
Statement 2005) 
DARPA 
Directors 
Johnson 
(’58-60) 
Betts (‘60-61) 
Ruina (‘61-63) 
Sproull (‘63-65) 
Herzfeld (‘65-67) 
Rechtin (‘67-70) 
Lukasik (‘70-75) 
Heilmeir (‘75-77) 
Fossum (‘77-81) 
Cooper (’81-85) 
Duncan (’85-88) 
Colladay (’88-89) 
Fields (’89-90) 
Reis (’90-92) 
Denman (’92-95) 
Lynn (’95-98) 
Fernandez (’98-01) 
Tether (’01-08) 
DARPA 
Environment 
Supercede 
inter-service 
rivalry; 
prevent 
technological 
surprises 
Scientific merit over 
military; focus on best 
people - independence, 
intellectual quality 
Mid-term exams, 
deliverables, success 
measures 
Strategic computing 
initiative (’83); 
Sematech (‘87); 
pyramid of 
technologies; 
connecting academia 
and industry 
Fernandez priorities: 
people, competition, 
outreach, 
experimentation (‘98) 
Phases, milestones, 
accountability; 
“Transforming 
Fantasy” (01-03); 
“Bridging the Gap” 
(’03-‘08) 
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international environment surrounding DARPA have throughout its history been strong 
determinants of DARPA’s focus and its execution of its mission. (For a detailed discussion, see 
Appendix 1.) Further, while the computing industry’s structure and technological maturity are 
undeniably different today than they were in the past, many themes repeat themselves.  For 
example, there are notable parallels between Tether’s period and leadership and that of George 
Heilmeier in the 1970s.  The paragraphs which follow detail the most recent shift within 
DARPA, first by describing the political and economic environment and DARPA leadership 
from 1992-2001, and then by describing the period from 2001-2008. 
 
In 1992, Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney announced “a new, post-Cold War 
DoD strategy of spending less on procurement of new military systems, while maintaining 
funding for R&D to develop new technologies for building future systems and for upgrading 
existing systems”(OTA, 1993).  This statement proved to be representative of (D)ARPA during 
the 1990s.  During the period from 1992-2001 DARPA was led by three directors – Gary 
Denman (1992 – 1995), Larry Lynn (1995 –1998), and Frank Fernandez (1998-2001).  While 
Gary Denman was appointed under President George H.W. Bush, he continued to serve as 
director for another two years under President William Clinton, who took office on January 20, 
1993. In their 1993 assessment, the OTA writes, “Early stages of R&D, in which ARPA is most 
heavily involved (basic research through technology demonstration), will probably be least 
affected by reductions in defense spending” (following the cold war.)  They continue, 
“Furthermore, based on military interests alone, ARPA will probably become more involved in 
the development of dual-use technologies. Despite the apparent divergence of military and 
commercial systems, many component technologies from which these systems are constructed 
continue to converge” (OTA, 1993). It was also in 1993, during Denman’s tenure, that DARPA 
briefly dropped its “D” and returned to it’s original name of ARPA. 
   
Following Denman, Larry Lynn and Frank Fernandez were both subsequently appointed by 
President Clinton. Both Lynn and Fernandez continued the focus within (D)ARPA on basic 
research.  In an article on the ingredients of military innovation and transformation, written by 
Lynn after he retired from DARPA, Lynn notes that an often-used criterion within DARPA when 
evaluating the probability of technical and operational success of a project was “If you succeed 
in all your goals, will it make a real difference?” (Lynn, 2003).  Lynn was also part of DARPA’s 
first inclusion of basic biology research into DARPA’s budget (Marshall, 1997).  Fernandez, in 
turn, focused on quality and independence in a manner reminiscent of ARPA’s second director, 
Ruina.  In his March 2000 statement to the Senate, Fernandez states that he has four priorities.  
Starting with what he believes to be the most important, he states that these are “to attract top-
quality people; to foster an atmosphere of healthy competition for top performers; to reach 
outside the normal DoD industrial base for ideas; and to work with the Services and the Unified 
Commands to use experimentation as a vehicle to provide the iteration between operational 
concept and technology development that I feel is necessary to achieve revolutionary innovation 
in war fighting” (Fernandez, 2000). 
 
On January 20, 2001, George W. Bush took office as the 43rd President of the United States, 
and on June 18, 2001, Tony Tether was appointed as the new Director to head DARPA.  Prior to 
becoming the director of DARPA, Tether had steadily risen in his career through a combination 
of military and industrial positions.  Having served for four years as the DOD’s national 
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intelligence (1978-1982), he came to the position of DARPA director under a directive from 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the new director must make DARPA an 
entrepreneurial hotbed that will give the U.S. military the tools it will need to maintain the 
nation’s access to space and to protect satellites in orbit from attack (Rensselaer, 2002). 
 
By the time of Tether’s appointment, much had already changed in the innovation landscape 
and the computing industry landscape within which DARPA acted.  Within months, however, of 
Tether’s appointment, many aspects of the political landscape in the U.S. also began to change.  
Less than three month after Tether was appointed, two hijacked planes were flown into the 
World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001.  Still, the theme of DARPATech 
2002 remained “Transforming Fantasy,” and Tether’s introduction speech at that time, while it 
mentions “transitioning” technology and milestones, still has significant focus on people and 
looking far out into the future (Tether, 2002).  On October 16, 2002, however, Congress 
authorized President Bush to use force in Iraq, and on March 21, 2003, the U.S. began its 
invasion. On March 27, 2003, of the same year, Tether’s statement to the House of 
Representatives provides the first glimpses of his shift in focus towards to “bridging the gap” 
between fundamental discoveries and military use (Tether, 2003b), and his May 14, 2003 
statement to congress includes a note that only 5% of the DARPA budget is meant to be for 
fundamental research (Tether, 2003a).  Sometime during this period, the slogan “Bridging the 
Gap” subsequently becomes part of the logo for DARPA.  Whether in response to the September 
11th attacks and the Iraq war, the need to customize commercially-made products, or due to other 
reasons, under Tether’s rein, DARPA has made many changes, as documented in Table 2.   
 
Table 2: Shift in DARPA Funding Mechanisms 1992-2008. 
 Pre-Tether (1992-2000) Post-Tether (2001-2008) 
Funding primarily of university-based 
research 
 
Funding shifted from universities to industry 
(especially, established vendors) 
Broad Area Announcements (BAA), 
Few checks and balances on meeting 
program targets 
Multiple phase solicitations: 12-16 month 
intervals, Funds tied to go/no-go reviews 
linked to specific deliverables  
Δ
 in
 D
A
R
PA
 F
un
di
ng
 
St
ru
ct
ur
e Solicitations open to anyone being the 
prime contractor 
Many soliciations preclude universities and 
small start-ups as prime contractors, instead 
requiring the formation of teams with the 
established vendors as the prime contractors 
 
These changes in DARPA policy brought on an outcry from the computing community 
(JointStatement, 2005; Lazowska and Patterson, 2005; Markoff, 2005). Although overall funding 
by DARPA has remained constant, the proportion going to university researchers has dropped by 
nearly half (Lazowska and Patterson, 2005; Markoff, 2005).  Several other policy changes at 
DARPA in the past seven years have further acted to discourage university participation and 
signaled a shift from pushing the leading edge of research to “bridging the gap” between 
fundamental research and deployable technologies (JointStatement, 2005; Lazowska and 
Patterson, 2005). Today DARPA has increased classification of research programs and increased 
restrictions on the participation of non-citizens (JointStatement, 2005; Lazowska and Patterson, 
2005).  In strong contrast to the historically well-known flexibility and discretion of DARPA’s 
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broad area announcements, today’s funds are tied to “go/no-go” reviews linked to specific 
deliverables and applied to research at 12- to 18-month intervals (JointStatement, 2005; 
Lazowska and Patterson, 2005; Markoff, 2005).  Further, many solicitations now preclude 
universities and small start-ups from submission as prime contractors, instead requiring the 
formation of teams and forcing start-ups and universities to hook up with large established 
vendors (DefenseScienceBoard, 2005). 
 
4. Industry Background: A Changing Landscape in Computer Science in the United States 
 
The robustness of DARPA over five decades to changing political and economic times is indeed 
a testament to its design as an organization. This changing political and economic environment, 
however, has in many ways been the least of DARPA’s challenges.  As or more challenging has 
been how the steady evolution and maturing of the computing industry, to which DARPA’s 
support has been so fundamental, has led DARPA to have to learn to work within dramatically 
different industry and market structures and on technologies of dramatically different maturity. 
Thus, while the institutional changes led by Tony Tether in 2001 were met with great criticism 
from the academic computing community, it is important to note that they were preceded by 
dramatic changes in computing in the structure of the industry and of market demand.  Thus, by 
the time Tether took office, the environment necessary for his change, was already in place. 
 
4.1. Computing: Changes in Industry Structure, Market Structure, and the Sources of 
Innovation 
Industry structure and the location and structure of demand have changed dramatically in 
computing over the past 40 years. In 1960, as DARPA was moving beyond its initial role in 
space activities, the majority of computers were owned by government.  In that year, a total of 
1790 mainframes were sold, and companies were just starting to get involved in computing 
(NRC, 1999; HSUS, 2008).  In the 60s, computer science was just starting to emerge as a field 
(NRC, 1999).  By 1970, the number of mainframes sold had more than doubled to 5700, and 
2620 minicomputers were also sold (HSUS, 2008).  In 1970, computers were produced by large 
established firms (NRC, 1999).  In 1971, however, Intel introduced its first microprocessor, an 
event which would change the face of computing over the upcoming decades (IntelMuseum, 
2008).  By 1980, the first desktop workstations were beginning to emerge – with the Apple II 
introduced in 1977 and the IBM PC in 1981. Alone in 1980, 724,000 personal computers (PCs) 
were sold (online reference).  In accepting the IEEE Medal of Honor in 1978, Robert Noyce – 
founder of Fairchild Semiconductor and later of Intel, called for greater venture capital – a call 
that would come to define the structure of R&D and of the industry in the upcoming decade.  In 
1990, 20 million PCs were sold globally, and computers were produced by hundreds of suppliers 
(online reference) (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999).  These shifts are shown in Figure 1. 
 
These changes in industry and market structure have significant consequences for the way 
innovation can be managed, as well as where power and influence lie over the future of 
technology directions.  In the case of computer servers and systems, the cutting edge of 
technology has to a large extent moved from niche to high-volume markets. In 1960, high-end 
mainframe computers were entirely purchased by defense contractors.  By the 1980s, the 
computer market could be divided into three types of demand – business data processing in 
organizations (met with mainframes), business individual productivity applications (met with 
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PCs), and technical computing (met with minicomputers.)  The rise of networked computing 
technologies led to a convergence of these markets.  In particular, networks of personal 
computers and workstations were able to compete with (and eventually overcome) many 
minicomputer and mainframe markets (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999).  By the 1990s, 
innovation in commercial IT was outstripping that of the military.  As a consequence, in 1991 
Defense Secretary William Perry announced the DOD Strategic Acquisition Initiative (SAI) 
which mandated that defense contractors first look at commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products 
when developing new technology upgrades, and in 1994 Perry issues his defining memorandum, 
“Specifications & Standards – A New Way of Doing Business” – which became known as the 
COTS Initiative, and mandates the preference for commercial products (Saunders, 2004).  In 
1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen launched the Defense Acquisition Reform Initiative to 
Accelerate COTS (Saunders, 2004). Today, defense contractors custom-build the front-end, but 
buy the back-end from industry suppliers. Rapid advances in performance, high production 
volumes, and the switch to networked systems have helped microprocessors become standard 
across many traditionally customized computing applications. In the future, high production 
volumes may even further influence technology directions.  Specifically, whereas electronic 
components for PCs, in particularly DRAM chips and microprocessors, have traditionally 
dominated technical advance in semiconductors, in the future this technical advance may instead 
be directed by even higher volume component markets, such as those for cell phones and other 
mobile computing devices.  The implications of these market shifts for the military’s ability to 
develop technology to meet mission goals remain unclear. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Computer Industry Structure and Demand Sources 
 
These changes in industry and market structure have at the same time led to fundamental 
changes in the way corporate research is conducted in the computing industry.  In the earlier part 
of the 20th century, much R&D was still housed within corporate laboratories such as Bell 
Laboratories, GE Research, IBM Research, and Xerox Parc (Mowery, 1999; NAS, 2007).  These 
large U.S. corporate laboratories of the 1950s and 1960s performed much of the fundamental 
research that underlies today’s mainstream semiconductor technology (Macher et al., 2000).  In 
1980, IBM still conducted 50% of the R&D in the computing industry (NRC, 1999).  Beginning 
in the 1980s, however, a combination of competitive pressure, the perception of disappointing 
returns from investments in R&D, and the change in federal antitrust policy led many U.S. firms 
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to “externalize” a portion of their R&D operations (Mowery, 1999).  Today, complex networks 
of firms and close collaborations between users and producers of hardware and software now 
play an important role in developing new products.  However useful, collaborative R&D in the 
U.S. semiconductor industry has supported little long-term research (Macher et al., 2000).  
Although the leading U.S. merchant semiconductor firms, such as Intel, TI, Micron, and AMD, 
spend 10-15 percent of revenues on R&D, the bulk of these expenditures focus on new product 
development (Macher et al., 2000).  Further, none of the new leading small firms in digital 
communications maintain internal semiconductor R&D; instead focusing their efforts on product 
definition, system design, and marketing of their end products (Macher et al., 2000).  Today, the 
game in the computing industry is part integration (whether an idea or a component), rather than 
new (from scratch) inventions (Iansiti, 1997). (See Table 3.) 
 
Table 3: Shifting Innovation Ecosystem and Industry and Market Structures in Computing 
 First Three Decades (1950-1980) Recent Three Decades (1980-present) 
Corporate R&D Labs (Macher 2000; 
Mowery 2000; NAS 2006) 
Increased reliance on external sources of 
R&D (Mowery 1999) 
Δ
 in
 In
no
va
tio
n 
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 Firm-based innovation trajectories Complex networks of firms, universities, 
government labs.  Interdependency of 
innovation trajectories across products (NRC 
1999, Mowery 1999:7, Powell and Grodal 
2005) 
Few pioneering firms supplied computers Hundreds loosely linked supplers (Bresnahan 
2000) 
Δ
 in
 In
du
st
ry
 
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
Primary demand government contractors Primary demand (high volumes) commercial 
applications 
 
Δ
 in
 
D
em
an
d Government contractors order 
customized products 
Government contractors customize 
commercial products 
 
 
3.2 Computing: The Changing Quantity and Sources of Government Funding  
 
In parallel with these dramatic shifts within the computing industry itself has been a shift in the 
nature and structure of government funding of computing research and development.  Substantial 
government, especially military, research funding backed the development of many of the 
technical and systems capabilities in the early U.S. computer industry (Bresnahan and 
Greenstein, 1999; NRC, 1999).  Roughly 70 percent of total university research funding in 
computing between 1976 and 1990 came from the federal government (NRC, 1999).  More than 
half the papers cited in computing patenting applications in 1993-1994 acknowledge government 
funding (NRC, 1999).  By 1992, however, the total percent of federal funding for computing 
research had significantly declined.2   
                                                
2 Federally funded R&D in the U.S. computing and semiconductor industries (here based on SIC 367, electronic 
components) declined from nearly 25 percent of total R&D spending in 1980 to slightly less than 7 percent in 1992 
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At the same time, there has been a significant change in the sources and structure of this 
government in the last two decades.  Since the early 1960s, the federal agencies most responsible 
for supporting computing research have been the National Science Foundation (NSF), the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Department of Energy (DOE) 
(JointStatement, 2005).  In 1998, NSF and DARPA bore a leading and nearly equal share of the 
overall federal investment in IT R&D, with DARPA funding 30 percent and NSF 27 percent 
(JointStatement, 2005).  However, as the overall government funding of computing research has 
increased, DARPA’s share – both as a percentage of the overall effort and in absolute dollars – 
has declined.  By 2005, while NSF represented 35 percent of overall federal IT R&D funding, 
DARPA represented just 6 percent (JointStatement, 2005).  Unlike the NSF, which awards peer 
reviewed grants and funds a broader set of institutions (NRC, 1999), DARPA is historically 
known for its “blue sky” funding, large discretion and flexibility, bets on vision and reputation, 
and ability to create and nourish communities of researchers to focus on problems of particular 
interest to the agency.  As a consequence, DARPA is frequently seen as critical in seeding and 
encouraging new technology directions and fields in the U.S. (NRC, 1999; Roland, 2002; 
JointStatement, 2005; Markoff, 2005).  With the decline in DARPA’s proportion of overall 
funding and DARPA’s recent changes in policy, many see this traditional role of DARPA as 
threatened.  (See Table 4.) 
 
Table 4: Shifting Structure of Government Funding for Computing 
 
Federal Investment in IT R&D  
(1998 snapshot) 
Federal Investment in IT R&D 
(2005 Snapshot) 
Δ
 in
 F
ed
. 
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ve
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n 
C
om
pu
tin
g 
Federal Investment in IT R&D:  
DARPA 30% 
NSF 27%  
 
Federal Investment in IT R&D: 
DARPA 6% (total investment constant) 
NSF 35% (total investment has risen) 
(JointStatement 2005) 
 
 
5. Methods 
This paper uses grounded theory-building methods (Glasner and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1989) to unpack the processes by which DARPA fosters new technology trajectories 
within the innovation ecosystem. Using case study research, I focus on four materials 
technologies funded by DARPA and critical to the advancement of Moore’s Law.  Two of these 
technologies – SiGe and strained Si – received DARPA funding in the mid-90s and were 
subsequently introduced into microprocessor designs and mainstream Si-CMOS production 
lines. The remaining two materials advances – 3D packaging technology and integrated 
photonics – are in early stages of DARPA funding and development, but are identified by the 
ITRS Roadmap and in academic publications as potentially critical to continuing Moore’s Law 
in the upcoming decade. All four of these technologies are technologies invested in by program 
managers within DARPA’s Microsystems Technology Office (MTO), which until April 1999 
went by the name of the Electronics Technology Office (ETO) (Reed, 1999). 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Macher, Mowery, and Hodges 2000).  This is due, in large part, to a rise in industry computing research funding 
from 1983 to 1990.  Industry research funding for computing dropped to government levels by 1994, but by 1996 
were back to their 1992 values (NRC 1999).  Government funding for computing continued to rise slightly between 
1990 and 1996 (NRC 1999). 
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To study these cases, I triangulate participant observation, qualitative interview data, 
archival data, and bibliometric data to provide a holistic view of the forces driving technological 
change (Jick, 1979). My results primarily draw from 50 semi-structured interviews with 
scientists and technologists (including DARPA program managers) who were involved in the 
development of the SiGe, strained silicon, integrated photonics, and optical interconnect 
technologies between 1992 and 2008.  I identify key scientists and technologists in the “invisible 
college” {Crane, 1972 #457} in this technical area through a snowball effect based on names 
mentioned in early interviews and in news documents.  I subsequently cross-checked this list and 
identified additional DARPA program mangers involved in funding these technologies using 
DARPA’s online archives for the period.  All together, I executed the interviews so as to ensure 
that they included (1) DARPA program managers from both before and after Tony Tether took 
the directorship,3 and (2) a representative cross-section of scientists and technologists from 
within academic institutions, start-ups, and the five established microprocessor vendors – Intel, 
AMD, IBM, HP, and Sun. I also asked each respondent to provide an up-to-date biography and 
CV, including a list of all of their publications and patents to-date in their career.  I use these 
individual CVs to better understand the bibliometric records of each interviewee, as well as they 
co-patenting and co-publishing records with other scientists. 
I conducted several participant observations throughout the course of the study to gain 
insights into both the optoelectronics and microelectronics industries and DARPA’s role in 
technology development. Early on, I was able to conduct a three-hour participant observation of 
a DARPA-funded team in the process of developing its technology so as to acquire Phase II 
funding.  I was also able to attend multiple industry conferences throughout the course of the 
study, due to my own technical activity in the area during my dissertation, through additional 
connections from my interviews, and through my ongoing professional activities studying the 
converging telecom and computing industry.  These industry conferences included three of the 
Bi-annual Microphotonics Industry Consortium conferences (Fall 2007, Spring 2007, Fall 2008), 
Phontics North 2007, the 2007 IEEE Computer Elements Vail Workshop, the Optoelectronics 
Industry Association (OIDA) 2008 Annual Forum, and the OIDA Manufacturing and Innovation 
in the 20th Century Workshop in Spring 2008.   
Finally, I have been able to draw on extensive archival data available through the CMU 
libraries, online, and saved within the personal collections of David Hounshell. DARPA provides 
a wealth of archival data online, as well as through their technical archives.  In addition, a host of 
information about both DARPA and company initiatives can be found in the popular press, 
congressional hearings, and in industry trade journals.  Together, I use these online DARPA 
archives, the available news sources to document DARPA solicitations, workshops, conferences, 
and press releases as related to the four materials technologies.   
 
6. Results and Discussion 
Over the past twenty years, DARPA, the computing industry, and the U.S. innovation 
ecosystem have all undergone tremendous change. In the first section of the results, I identify 
five characteristics of DARPA as an organization that frame its success in seeding and 
encouraging new technology trajectories throughout the decades. The section also sheds insights 
                                                
3 In the course of data collection, significant challenges emerged in gaining clearance to interview current DARPA 
program managers.  After extensive discussions, I have received clearance for interviews with four critical program 
managers.  These interviews are set for July 9-10 at DARPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., and will be included 
in the final paper by September 2008. 
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into what about DARPA has enabled it to be so robust to changing political, economic, and 
technical times.  The second section of the results then draws on interviews of DARPA 
Microsystem Technology Office program managers and technologists in the field they funded 
from industry and academia to unpacks five distinct steps by which DARPA program managers 
during the period from 1992 to 2001 seeded and encouraged new technology trajectories. The 
third section of the results then explores the changes within DARPA since 2001.  Here, I again 
draw on archival data and interviews with academics, industry members, and program managers 
but instead from 2001-2008.  This section again proposes five methods by which DARPA seeds 
and encourages new technology trajectories, and compares these methods, and the recipients of 
their efforts, to those found in the previous period. 
 
6.1. DARPA: The Institution 
Despite the many changes both within DARPA and in its external environment, a number of 
characteristics, interpreted differently during different periods of the organization, have been 
claimed to be as paramount of DARPA as an organization.  Richard VanAtta, a long-time 
observer and writer on DARPA, summarizes the DARPA organizational environment into three 
key characteristics:  (1) it is independent from service R&D organizations, (2) it is a lean, agile 
organization with risk-taking culture, and (3) it is idea-driven and outcome oriented (VanAtta, 
2007).  These themes are echoed in DARPA’s self-described 12 organizing elements, along with 
two additional themes – a focus on hiring quality people (“an eclectic, world-class technical 
staff”), and the importance of DARPA’s role in connecting collaborators (Bonvillian, 2006).  
Again the extent to which these additional two themes have been a focus, and how they have 
been applied within the organization has varied over the years. This paper does not focus on 
DARPA’s organizational structure, per se, but rather on the specific processes by which DARPA 
influences technology trajectories. It is thus the last theme of connecting  -- also found in 
VanAtta’s articles and in Roland’s research on the strategic computing initiative --  on the which 
this paper places the greatest focus (Roland, 2002; VanAtta, 2007). Inevitably, however, 
DARPA program managers act within and are influenced by the institutional environment and 
organizational structure of DARPA.  I begin, therefore, by highlighting five aspects of DARPA 
particularly significant to understanding how its program managers influence the direction of 
technical change. 
 
6.1.1. A Culture Which Supports Risk-Taking 
 
(At DARPA you can) … place bets with enormous risk, and very few penalties of failing.  
It’s probably better to have spectacular failures than just lots of failures. 
 
Among the many books and articles which over time have been written about DARPA it 
is often suggested that critical to DARPA’s success in enabling revolutionary new technologies 
is it’s risk-taking culture (NRC, 1999; Roland, 2002; Bonvillian, 2006; VanAtta, 2007).  The 
interpretation of what constitutes DARPA’s mission of “advanced technology development” and 
what constitutes a risk-taking culture has varied with the DARPA director and the climate of the 
times (NRC, 1999; VanAtta, 2007).  For example, both Heilmeier in the 1970s, and Tony Tether, 
in his current position, have placed emphasis on short-term milestones, and discontinuing 
programs unable to meet their deliverables (NRC, 1999; Tether, 2002). This does not necessarily 
mean that the programs themselves even during those times were not risk-taking.  
 15 
  
As explained by one university professor, this risk-taking funding perspective can “play a 
huge role in selecting key ideas.”  This university professor, who has received DARPA funding 
throughout his career, describes the significance of DARPA funding in the scheme of NSF and 
other funding options. 
  
NSF is much more peer-review, . . . When you have a huge peer review and so on, if 
something is too radical, it gets killed.  So you kind of get the lowest common denominator 
funded.  But with DARPA, they’ll take flyers.  They’ll say this is really radical.  A huge chance of 
success or a huge chance of failure, but a big upside. 
 
6.1.2. Connected, Outcome-Oriented Projects with Long-Term Vision 
 
It is important to note that while individual researchers’ projects or even entire DARPA 
programs may be risky, DARPA is housed within the Department of Defense, and its programs 
are aimed at advancing technologies toward a specific long-term aim related to military needs. 
As such, DARPA is far from a pure venture capitalist – both 1) in that it does not fund a project 
through to market commercialization, stopping instead at the point when the idea has been 
conceptualized and industry or military missions are ready to take over, and 2) in that while it 
may not know at the start the exact technologies to meet it’s long-term needs, its portfolio of 
technologies are created with a long-term need in mind.  Inevitably, the extent to which 
individual program managers’ research visions have aligned with specific military needs has 
varied over the years by program manager and by the director at the time. Likewise, the extent to 
which a given DARPA office and a given DARPA program manager have a single vision varies, 
but inevitable they must write a succinct research program as part of their application to become 
a program manager.  J.C.R. Licklider, for example, had a clear vision of “man-computer 
symbiosis” when he came to ARPA to head IPTO in 1962 (NRC, 1999).  Licklider’s successor, 
Robert Kahn, first conceived the Strategic Computing Initiative as a pyramid of related 
technologies (Roland, 2002).  In this scheme, progress would materialize as developments 
flowed up the pyramid from infrastructure at the bottom through microelectronics, architecture, 
and artificial intelligence to machine intelligence at the top.  The goal of the Strategic Computing 
Initiative was to develop each of these layers and then connect them (Roland, 2002).  A similar 
pyramid approach is being followed in the Microsystems Technology Office by its director, 
Robert Leheney today.  In contrast, Steven Squires, briefly director of the Information Science 
and Technology Office, and later director of the Computer Systems Technology Office, 
envisioned research as a continuum.  Instead of single technologies to serve a given objective, he 
sought multiple implementations of related technologies.  He called this array of capabilities 
from which users could connect different possibilities to create the best solution “grey coding” 
(Roland, 2002).  As described by Roland, “His research map was not a quantum leap into the 
unknown, but a rational process of connecting the dots between here and there” (Roland, 2002). 
During my own interviews, DARPA program managers from the last decade and a half described 
some times where they funded multiple researchers working on the same technology, and other 
times where they funded researchers with different technology options to compete against each 
other toward achieving a common performance goal. 
 
6.1.3. Little Hierarchy 
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DARPA was created to have little bureaucracy or hierarchy.  To get a new project funded, a 
program manager need only go through two approval steps – his or her office director, and the 
director of DARPA.  One DARPA program manager describes his experience in this 
environment as follows,  
 
I mean you could just turn on a dime.  We could basically call people up, and have a 
discussion.  With the idea that if we see something here, we could fund a seeding, and get 
something and see if there’s a next step. 
 
To further prevent bureaucracy, DARPA is organized such that turnover of personnel is 
generally high.  Neither DARPA program managers, nor the office directors, nor the director him 
or herself are life-long bureaucrats.  Instead, they are pulled from the research community within 
academia, industry, or the government labs for brief periods of their careers.  The period each of 
the DARPA directors held office is shown in Appendix 2.  As can be seen, the mean directorship 
has been 2.7 years, and the mode, 2 years.  Similarly, while there are some exceptions, and 
several cases where program managers later come back for a second period as an office director, 
both office directors and program managers generally hold their positions for no more than 3-5 
years.  While office directors and even program managers often choose their successor – thus 
helping create continuity across research programs, this turnover helps continually bring in new 
ideas and new social networks into the DARPA office.  This turnover, especially of the director, 
also helps DARPA remain flexible and resilient to changing political and environmental times. 
 
6.1.4. The Program Manager 
 
It really comes down to the program manager.  A program manager that has a passion 
for an idea, that understands the technical elements of an idea, and has some vision for where it 
might go. 
- DARPA Program Manager 
 
To understand the role of DARPA in influencing technology development, one must start 
with the public servants who are on the ground. Program managers are traditionally taken from 
the existing research network – including government labs, universities, or industry.  Although 
program managers can be professors, they do not even need to have Ph.D.s.  The role a program 
manager is known historically within the technical community not only as a stepping stone to 
higher positions, but also as one of the more exciting opportunities within one’s career, involving 
much freedom and influence over the future of technology.    
 
6.1.5. The Role of Relationships 
 
Since its beginnings, DARPA has been known for working off of relationships.  In the 60s, most 
of its funding went to a few elite institutions – MIT, Carnegie Mellon, Stanford, and a few other 
schools – with the austensible goal of supporting the best people and their graduate students in a 
context promising positive reinforcement among the different programs (Roland, 2002).  
According to Roland, the IPTO most often filled its vacancies by unilateral invitation to 
members of what came to be known as the “ARPA community.”  This community consisted of 
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those researchers who regularly get ARPA contracts, and sit on ARPA advisory boards (Roland, 
2002). 
 
Today, DARPA continues to be known within the technical community as making funding 
decisions based on relationships.  Program managers pull on their existing social network from 
prior to taking the position – a network which frequently grows after rising to the role of 
program manager.  Regardless of whether a conversation is with a DARPA program manager, a 
university professor, or a member of industry; as shown in Table 5, talk about DARPA funding 
decisions emphasizes the importance of relationships. 
 
Table 5: The Role of Relationships in DARPA Funding Decisions 
DARPA Program Manager University Professor 
… I knew there was a chance 
they wouldn’t make it.  But at 
the time, I was betting on the 
person.  Usually, I’d bet on a 
few people. 
And then he (DARPA program manager) touched on people 
like (professor’s name) and others who he knew well, and said, 
hey, help me, give me the ideas.  So, he touches on (same 
professor’s name), he touched on other key leaders in the field 
that he knew and trusted 
 
This networked approach, inevitably has its pros and cons. Researcher of social networks 
have long commented on the existence “communities of practice” and “invisible colleges” in 
which knowledge flows (or “leaks”) easily across firm and institutional barriers between 
researchers of common discipline (Crane, 1972; Allen, 1983; VonHippel, 1987; Brown and 
Duguid, 2001). DARPA program managers are inevitable brought into their positions out of this 
community.  Once in their positions, as “100 geniuses connected by a travel agent” (Bonvillian, 
2006) they further their ties and understanding of the disparate activities within this community.  
It is specifically through these strong ties with researchers in the community and intimate 
knowledge of their research activities, that DARPA program managers are able to do the type of 
connecting of ideas introduced in section 5.1.3, and unpacked in great detail throughout this 
paper.  At the same time, tightly knit social networks have been shown to lend themselves 
towards “group think” (Powell and Grodal, 2005).  The extent to which DARPA program 
managers are able to avoid “group think” through their travels to visit researchers and extend 
their network, will inevitably vary greatly by program manager.  Further, the extent to which the 
turnover of personnel within DARPA may help prevent such “group think” in DARPA as a 
whole, may depend on the selection processes for the director and office managers.  Even here, 
trade-offs remain between selecting new directors so as to support continuity of programs versus 
the bringing in of new ideas.  Alone, the extent to which DARPA has morphed over the years to 
meet the changing political and technical environment, suggests that at an organizational level, 
the DARPA has proved quite adaptive and resilient, and perhaps avoided a certain amount of 
long-term “group think”. 
 
6.2. DARPA in the 1990s (1992-2001) 
 
The section which follows draws on archives and interviews from academics, industry 
members, and DARPA program managers active during the period from 1992-2001. Based on 
these interviews, DARPA archives, and press releases, I identify five processes by which 
DARPA program managers during this period tap into existing social networks to seed and 
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encourage new technology trajectories.  These five processes are (1) identifying directions, (2) 
gaining momentum, (3) building community, (4) validating new directions and (5) not sustaining 
the technology.  I describe each of these processes in detail, and their significance below. 
 
(1) Brainstorming Ideas, Identifying Directions 
 In understanding the role of DARPA program manager, one important questions is the 
extent to which DARPA program managers come with a vision, or act as a place to which 
researchers within the field with a vision can come.  The answer is inevitably both.  Industry and 
academic researchers consistently describe themselves as the people with the ideas, and DARPA 
program managers as the people who funded them, provided legitimacy, and helped provide the 
funding and community support to bring the vision to fruition.  Yet, in this very role, whether as 
funder or knowledge-holder, the DARPA program manager becomes a central node to which 
information from the research community flows.  Further, in understanding long-term military 
goals, it is the DARPA program manager who is in closest contact and, in some cases, the single 
bridge between the research community and the world of defense.  Thus, as described by the 
DARPA program managers themselves, they are not the “windows” for ideas, described by 
Block (Block 2007), rather they are the symphony directors written about by Roland.  Still, this 
analogy is lacking, since the researchers do not merely play pre-defined notes on pre-defined 
instrument, but instead bring ideas to the DARPA program managers, which in turn shape their 
symphony.  This two-dimensional role takes two forms within DARPA -- bringing leaders 
together for brainstorming to identify technology directions to meet agency mission goals 
(discussed yet in this section under point (1)), and seeding disparate researchers to gain 
momentum around common themes (discussed in the next section under point (2)).  In both 
cases, the DARPA program managers are in constant contact with the research community, 
understanding emerging research themes, and choosing the right players to bring together. 
 
DARPA has both formal and informal methods for bringing together top scientists to brainstorm 
research directions to meet mission goals. Among its formal mehods, the DARPA-Defense 
Science Research Council holds an annual summer conference which brings together “a group of 
the country’s leading scientists and engineers for an extended period, to permit them to apply 
their combined talents in studying and reviewing future research areas in defense sciences” 
(DSRC, 1997). At this summer conference, top scientific and technical researchers in the country 
are exposed to major problems facing the U.S. military, and asked to leverage their expertise to 
identify technological directions to solve these challenges.   During the year, workshops and 
program reviews are attended by smaller groups of the Council members, whose reports are 
made directly to DARPA (DSRC, 1997). In addition to the annual summer conference and these 
workshops, other relevant formal advisory activities include broader Department of Defense 
efforts to identify technology directions including Defense Science Board (DSO) task forces, and 
Information Sciences and Technology Study Groups (ISAT).4 Task forces by the DSO5 or ISAT 
can be called to address specific topics or challenges of interest to DARPA. For example, a 
                                                
4 ISAT has similar workings to the Defense Science Board task forces, but are focused on military challenges 
associated with information technology. 
5 The DSO was established in 1956, in response to recommendations of the Hoover Commission.  Today, the DSO’s 
authorized size is 32 members selected for the preeminence in science and technology and its application to military 
operations, and seven ex-officio members.  The task force consists of DSO board members, and other selected 
consultants or experts. DSO`, 2008. "Defense Science Board: History."   Retrieved November 3, 2008, 2008, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/history.htm. 
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February 2005 DSO task force focused on High Performance Microchip Supply, a primary area 
in which work is being conducted by DARPA, and included representatives from industry and 
the government, including DARPA. Finally, DARPA also has a long history of gaining outside 
council from elite, and technology-oriented organizations, through funded studies by the Jasons, 
and independent labs such as Lincoln Labs and MITRE. 
 
DARPA is not limited to holding these brainstorming sessions to identify directions within these 
formal committees.  Brainstorming sessions can also be called together by individual DARPA 
program managers, and can be much more informal.  One DARPA program manger describes 
his role in bringing scientific leaders together around a common theme, 
 
 We were talking with Paul Robinson about the notion of building very very high volume 
carbon nanotubes that were functionally matched…. And I said, gee, Rick’s always been working 
in that area, let’s just call him in. Rick’s a noble prize chemist.  So we called him.  He was there 
in two days.  And so Lieber came over from Harvard.  We sat around.  And it was a great 
discussion. 
 
 The above-described interaction occurred in the mid-90s.  Here, in supporting innovation 
DARPA program managers are the cocktail hosts described by Lester and Piore in Innovation: 
The Missing Dimension (Lester and Piore, 2004).  Thus, the DARPA program managers select 
the members of the party, and help start the conversation necessary to brainstorm and identify the 
necessary new directions.  Notably, as shown in Table 6, all of the people at the above-
mentioned gathering, with the exception of the DARPA program manager, could be 
characterized as Zucker’s “star scientists” (Zucker and Darby, 1996). None of them, however, 
have bibliometric or other paper trails of intellectual ties with each other.  These results are in 
striking contrast with the majority of social networks research, which focuses on documenting 
collaborations through patent co-authorships.  They are thus suggestive that it is precisely these 
critical, early-stage, informal, direction identifying, technical conversations which can not be 
found in biliometric studies. 
 
Table 6: Mid-90s Collaborators Brought Together by a DARPA Program Manager to Brainstorm 
on Carbon Nanotubes 
 Paul Robinson Richard Smalley Charles Lieber 
Occupation, mid-90s President, Sandia 
Corporation and 
Laboratories, Director 
Sandia National Labs 
Professor Chemistry, 
Physics, Astronomy, 
Rice University 
Professor, Chemistry, 
Harvard University 
Total Patents ? >90 >30 
Total Publications ? >394 >290 
Lifetime 
Achievements 
Elected member 
NAE, Outstanding 
Public Service Medal 
from Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
1996 Nobel Prize for 
discovery of 
“buckeyballs” 
Elected member NAS 
Co-authorships with 
each other 
None None None 
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(2) Gaining Momentum: Seeding Disparate Researchers 
  
The previous section describes a DARPA program manager facilitating in-person brainstorming 
between scientific and technological leaders in the field around a particular technological goal.  
In gaining momentum around a technology direction, however, the DARPA program manager 
need not necessarily, or at least immediately, bring everyone into the same geographic space.  
One DARPA program manager explains, 
 
 So I’ll tell you the SiGe story…. So, the first guy to show me this, actually two guys, … 
was the guy who founded Amberwave.  He showed me this is possible.  And then Jason Moo and 
UCLA, … he showed me a plot of bandgap as a function of percent Ge.  And he had two plots.  
He came to DARPA.  And he said, look, there is a dependency, here it is, it follows band gap 
theory.  … And I said, ‘Jason, two dots don’t make a program…. I need a third dot.’  And he 
faxed me a chart the next day.  … So I sent him a small seeding. 
 At the same time I called Bernie (a fellow at IBM), and I said, ‘Bernie, have you ever 
seen this bandgap dependency in SiGe?  You know, do you think it’s something we can exploit?’  
He said, ‘Funny you should ask. We’ve been looking at the same thing, and we’ve got some ideas 
as well.’  So I funded him $2M or whatever it was. 
 
As can be seen in combining the above quote and Table 7, the DARPA program manager is 
in contact with three star researchers, working in the same area.  In this function, he is neither 
acting as a broker—connecting otherwise disparate actors; nor as a boundary-spanner – 
identifying, translating, and relaying information across firm, cultural, or technical boundaries; in 
the traditional sense (Fleming and Waguespack, 2007).  (According to these definitions, brokers 
can span boundaries, but not all boundary-spanners can broker.)  Instead, the DARPA program 
manager is simply seed-funding these disparate researcher, perhaps relaying some knowledge 
about the one to the other or about general activities in the technical community, and not 
necessarily at first bringing them together at all. These results are significant given the results by 
Zucker and Darby, which suggest that star scientists are very protective of their techniques, 
ideas, and discoveries in their early years, tending to collaborate most with their own institution, 
which slows diffusion to other scientists (Zucker and Darby, 1996). 
 
Table 7: Technologists Funded by a DARPA Program Manager to Gain Momentum around Si 
Ge and Strained Si Technology 
 Eugene Fitzgerald Bernard Meyerson Jason Woo 
Occupation, mid-90s Associate Professor, 
Materials Science and 
Engineering 
IBM Fellow, Group 
Director 
Professor, Electrical 
Engineering, UCLA 
Occupation, 2008 Professor, Materials 
Science and 
Engineering 
IBM Fellow, V.P. and 
Chief Technologist, 
Systems and 
Technology Group 
Professor, Electrical 
Engineering, UCLA 
Total Patents >15 >40 ? 
Total Publications >186 >180 >100 
First paper in SiGe 1986 1986 1991 
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technology 
Evidence of co-
authorships with each 
other, or other 
cooperation 
None None IBM Faculty Award, 
1998 
 
(3) Building Community: Increasing Information Flows, Growing the Base 
 
The above results also have a second significance.  In receiving funding from DARPA, 
researchers are required to present to each other in workshops, thus further pushing the flow of 
knowledge around early-stage ideas.  Similar to the results in section (1), background research on 
the technologists referenced by the DARPA program managers show both Eugene Fitzgerald 
(“the guy who founded of Amberwave”) and Bernard Meyerson (“Bernie”) again to be what 
Zucker and Dary would classify as star scientists (Zucker and Darby, 1996).  Fitting with their 
classification as star scientists, neither Gene or Bernie – who are at different institutions – have 
never co-patented or co-published.  Yet, through DARPA, Bernie and Gene were brought 
together in workshops to present to each other their research.  Thus, what would otherwise have 
been knowledge kept within their organization was forced at some level (with the exception of 
some company-proprietary details which are presented solely to the program managers) to flow 
between the two.  Thus, in funding disparate researchers, DARPA program managers appear to 
be promoting the sharing of knowledge between star scientists, who left to their own devices 
would, according to the literature, tend to be very protective of their knowledge.  In the some 
cases, these workshops may even lead to new collaborations.  Jason Woo, for example, started in 
the field a bit later than Bernie or Gene (1991), and, as the 1998 IBM Faculty Award he received 
suggests, may have even developed a relationship with IBM through his funding from DARPA. 
 
(4) Providing Third-Party Validation of New Technology Directions 
In addition to it’s role in bringing researchers together to brainstorm new technology 
directions, seeding disparate researchers to gain momentum around those directions, and 
bringing those researchers together to share their results, DARPA also plays a fourth role in 
technology development.  Specifically, the actions of DARPA’s program managers also provide 
external validation for new directions.  The quotes below in Table 8 suggest that this validation 
of new technology directions holds weight in industry as well as with other funding agencies. 
 
Table 8: The Role of DARPA Funding in Providing Third Party Validation 
DARPA Program Manager University Professor 
So the DARPA piece, while large, was the 
validation for IBM to spend their own money.  
The same way for the Intel piece.  You know, 
Intel certainly looked at that project, and then 
Intel ended up funding it internally, but the 
fact that DARPA went back to them three and 
four times and said, this is an important thing, 
this is an important thing, you know, it got to 
the board of directors, and it got high enough 
that they set up a division to do this. 
See, once you’ve gotten funding from DARPA, 
you have an issue resolved, and so on, then you 
go right ahead and submit an NSF proposal.  
By which time your ideas are known out there, 
people know you, you’ve published a paper or 
two.  And then guys at NSF say, yeah, yeah, this 
is a good thing. … So NSF funding usually 
comes in a second wave.  DARPA provides 
initial funding. … So DARPA plays a huge role 
in selecting key ideas. 
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(5) Avoiding Reliance on the State 
Despite DARPA’s role in validating new technology directions both to other funding agencies 
and in industry, DARPA program managers take note to point out that DARPA is not the 
sustaining piece in commercializing any new technology.  As one DARPA program manager 
explains, 
 
So we ran all of these design-of-experiment concepts, and you know, … we were doing great 
stuff, really good science.  But the tipping point, … is the fact that IBM saw the value in this to 
the point that they started investing in it. 
 
This emphasis on not being the sustaining piece for a given technology is an important point.  
Early studies warned of the tendencies for companies to become reliant of support from the state 
(Allen et al., 1978; Sirbu, 1978; Zysman, 1983).  In the history of DARPA’s role in developing 
technology for the laser, the internet, the microprocessor, and the personal computer, DARPA 
avoided these pitfalls.  More recent studies of small-firm reliance on government funding, 
however, have shown different results.  In particular, a recent National Academies study of SBIR 
funding, showed that small businesses supported by SBIRs are not particularly successful at 
commercializing their technologies, however, are very successful at developing technologies 
which meet the particularly SBIR funding agency’s (i.e. DOD, DOE, or NIH) mission goals 
(Wessner, 2007).  
Thus, although there were inevitably failures, historical studies suggest that DARPA’s 
methods of brining together researchers to brainstorm new technology directions, seeding 
disparate researchers working in the same area to gain momentum around new technology 
directions, encouraging early-stage knowledge sharing between researchers in workshops, and 
providing early-stage validation to other funding agencies and industry met great success.  
Evidence of these successes can be found in numerous historical books, and include early 
development of laser technology (Bromberg, 1991; Hecht, 2005), photonics (Sternberg, 1992), 
microprocessors (Malone, 1995) – including the materials technologies (SiGE and Strained Si) 
focused on in this study and now successfully implemented in large-scale industry production, 
the personal computer (Allan, 2001) and high-performance computing technologies (NRC, 1999; 
Roland, 2002), and the internet (Abbate, 2000; Newman, 2002). 
 
6.3. DARPA Under Tony Tether (2001 – present) 
As discussed in section 3, the changes in DARPA, initiated under the leadership of Tony 
Tether, led to an outcry in the computing community.  Representative of these changes is the 
recent DARPA Ultraperformance Nanophotonic Inttrachip Communications (UNIC) program, 
outlined in Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9: DARPA Microsystems Technology Office (MTO) Ultraperformance Nanophotonic 
Intrachip Communications (UNIC) Program  
 Phase I Phase II Phase II 
Award Date February 2006 November 2006 March 2008 
Description Super-seedling, 
validity demonstration 
 $44M 
Timeline 9 months 2 years 5 ½ years 
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Primary Contractor 
Awardees 
1. HP 
2. IBM 
3. Sun Microsystems 
4. BAE Systems 
5. Analog Devices? 
1. HP 
2. IBM 
3. Sun Microsystems 
4. MIT I 
1. Sun Microsystems 
Additional Team 
Members 
1. ? 
2. Luxtera 
3. Luxtera 
4. MIT I 
5. MIT II 
1. Intel 
2. Luxtera 
3. Luxtera 
4. MIT I 
1. Luxtera, Kotura, 
Stanford UCLA 
 
In some ways, this UNIC program and the other programs like it at DARPA, are nothing new.  
They all follow a long tradition of DARPA initiatives supporting technology developments that 
in the long term contributed to Moore’s Law (see Appendix 3).  In the case of UNIC, the focus 
of the solicitation is on photonic integration -- combinations of lasers, modulators, and other 
devices fabricated on a single chip.  As is representative of the broader trends in the computing 
industry, efforts in photonics integration began in Bell Labs and other research labs in the 60s 
and 70s.  Innovations in photonic integration were in the late 90s pushed forward by small, 
telecommunications start-ups, due to the technology’s potential to reduce product size, improve 
reliability, and reduce packaging costs. In the long term, the established computing vendors are 
also interested in these integration technologies due to their potential to bring the higher 
information carrying capacity of photons into smaller applications such as cell phones, sensors, 
and computer applications. In addition, developing integration technologies for computer optical 
interconnects may be critical to sustaining Moore’s Law. Roadmaps from Intel and the ITRS 
suggest that this technology may be needed in the microprocessor industry as soon as 2012.  
Particularly critical may be the ability of optics to meet challenges communicating core-to-core, 
core-to-memory, and core-to-accelerator in the new paradigm of multi-core chips. 
 
As can be seen in Appendix 3, DARPA has since as early as 1995 played a significant role in 
supporting the development of integrated photonics and optical interconnect technologies.  As 
the upcoming section describes, since 2001 the processes by which DARPA program managers 
tap into their social networks – gaining momentum around ideas, seeding disparate researchers, 
encouraging early knowledge flows in workshops, and providing third party validation of new 
technology directions – have remained largely the same.  The institutional location of the people 
into whom they’re tapping and the requirements framework within which the solicitations now 
occur, however, have changed significantly. 
 
(1) Brainstorming Ideas, Identifying Directions 
 
Today DARPA continues to leverage both formal and informal processes to brainstorm and 
identify critical technology directions, as discussed in 6.2.  While the formal and informal 
processes have stayed the same, the people brought together in these networks may, indeed be 
different.  Additional data access would be necessary to study the changing composition of the 
Defense Science Research Council Summer meetings, and other formal and formal get-togethers. 
 
(2) Gaining Momentum: Orchestrating the Involvement of Established Vendors with Academics 
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and Start-up Companies 
 
A start-up company founder describes his interactions with DARPA’s program managers, and 
the role the program managers played in gaining momentum in the academic and industrial 
communities around their ideas. 
 
So DARPA has program managers, and we were talking to them, and they got excited 
about this project, and they said, let’s try to get a program out.  So we worked with … the 
DARPA program manager, and they got interested in the field, and they got a program out of 
this.  They got a bunch of other people involved in the program. 
As noted earlier, however, in this solicitation the start-up company was not able to be a primary 
contractor on the proposal.  Instead, they were forced to team up with an established vendor to 
receive funding for the project. 
 
(3a) Building Community: Enabling Knowledge Flows and Reducing Technical Uncertainty in a 
Fragmented Industry 
 
In addition to DARPA program manager roles in gaining momentum around new ideas by 
linking academic and start-ups with established vendors, in today’s model, DARPA funding 
recipients are required to attend workshops at the end of each multi-month phase, where they 
present their results to each other. One industry respondent expresses the importance of such an 
opportunity to coordinate in today’s industry environment, 
 
You just can’t make anything happen in industry (today) on your own, because it’s 
completely impossible.  You have to find a partner, you have to convince your competition this is 
the right thing to do. 
 
The mandate to present the results of each phase has powerful implications, depending on 
the people in the room.  In the case of established vendors, DARPA workshops may provide 
them with a critical opportunity to share new ideas and agree (implicitly or explicitly) on 
technology directions.  In response to an early proposal presentation I gave on this work at an 
industry conference, one university professor angrily responded, 
 
 I can tell you what you’ll find.  I was there (at the DARPA workshop), and they’re (the 
companies) all presenting to each other what they’re going to do.  They’re all talking to each 
other.  And they’re all doing the same thing. 
 
(3b) Building Community: Enabling Technology Platform Leadership at the System Level 
 
To enable the necessary technology coordination within the vertically fragmented industry, the 
new DARPA may be playing a third, critical role.  In particular, it is unclear whether in the new, 
innovation ecosystem, individual entities – whether venture-funded start-ups or the larger 
established vendors who through new open-sourcing paradigms expect to buy-up their 
innovations – have the incentive structures necessary to develop the technologies they need.  In 
the course of my interviews, several industry respondents suggested that DARPA played a 
critical role in establishing system-level coordination, examples of which are provided in Table 
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10 below. 
 
Table 10: The importance of government funding from the perspective of system vendors. 
Established Vendor A Established Vendor B 
You need someone with a 
longer term horizon.  Ten 
years from now, we want a 
teraflop of computing.  But we 
don’t have more than a six 
month time horizon. 
Here, the technology is being driven by the systems companies.  
Very few companies have the resources to do system-level 
exploration without DARPA funding.  DARPA funding is 
enabling the system players to determine the direction of this 
technology.  If you don’t get the system guys involved, you end 
up getting widgets that don’t work in the bigger picture. 
 
As can be seen in Table 10, the respondents from both established vendor A and established 
vendor B emphasize the importance of DARPA.  In the case of established vendor A, the senior 
technical staff member focuses on DARPA’s significance in providing a longer term horizon.  In 
the quote from established vendor B, the senior technology fellow focuses on DARPA’s 
importance in coordinating technology development across companies, and in particular, for 
forcing companies who provide technological components in the industry platform to fit with the 
needs of the broader system. 
 
This third step of the process may be equally important to start-ups.  Similar to established 
vendor B, the founder of one start-up emphasized the importance of developing technology with 
the broader industry platform and established vendor needs in mind.  He explains, 
 
(In contrast to a large company or M.I.T.), “…as a small company, you have to develop a 
contact.  Headhunters…[can] also bring information to you.  We are starting to discuss with 
(large systems vendor)…. They’re trying to keep us developing pieces of technology they need. 
 
Within the old DARPA, the mandate to present research – which would have occurred less 
frequently – may have forced star scientists to divulge information that they might otherwise 
have kept confidential within their institution.  In contrast, in the case of the new DARPA, and 
the teams it forms between universities, start-ups, and established vendors, this divulgence of 
information may be critical in supporting the coordination necessary across companies, including 
competitors, to enable technological change. 
 
(4) Providing Third Party Validation for New Technology Directions 
 
This role of DARPA in enabling knowledge sharing among competitors and thereby in reducing 
uncertainty around technology directions, need not benefit the established vendors alone.  
Similar to the third-party validation role described about DARPA in the previous section, a 
current start-up founder describes a similar role for them from DARPA today.  In the case of the 
start-up company, DARPA’s funding acts as a signal validating the start-ups’s technology to the 
broader industrial community.  The start-up founder explains, 
 
Investors are highly motivated to see the company succeed.  As a consequence, they will 
lie through their teeth about what the company can do.  DARPA funding and ATP funding have 
the added benefit of communicating to a third party a validation of the technology. 
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(5) Breeding Reliance on the State? 
 
Not all of the respondents at established vendors or founders of start-up companies were as 
positive about DARPA as those respondents shown in Table 10.  Two examples are provided in 
Table 11, of respondents less positive about DARPA expressed concerns about government 
funding being “too far out” or too far from more pressing commercial realities. 
Since the time of the interview, however, the start-up has joined an established vendor’s team, 
and acquired DARPA funding for developing the longer-term technology. 
 
Table 11: Industry Concerns about DARPA Funding Drawing them Away from the Necessities 
of Meeting Commercial Goals  
Established Vendor C Start-up Company 
So, <my company> as a whole 
has just shied away from 
government funding. …<Our 
company> labs, or whatever, 
they’ll get a little DARPA 
funding, but most of that is, has 
never, produced anything of 
value, from a… commercial 
perspective.  That wasn’t saying it 
wasn’t of value within the 
industry, but just trying to 
delineate. 
Sometimes I’m very nervous about getting too much focus on 
defense money.  I don’t want to lose track of the fact that I’m 
developing products, not technology.  DARPA is funding the 
industry so far ahead.  If you’re developing for 10 years 
from now, DARPA is great.  But how do you manage not to 
lose revenue unless the market is starting in now… Some of 
the technology developed for the next generation – I don’t 
know if it is applicable that well to (now).  I’m not sure 
DARPA’s direction is the direction to go.  I think… <my 
company> is ideally placed for (today’s technology).  But, 
admittedly, not necessarily for the long term. 
 
The concerns expressed by established vendor C and by the start-up founder are not necessarily 
unwarranted.  Early research warned of the dangers of becoming reliant on the state for funding 
(Allen et al., 1978; Sirbu, 1978; Zysman, 1983).  While interviews with the pre-2001 DARPA 
program managers emphasize the importance of the company taking over and not being the 
sustaining piece of a technology’s development, these themes did not arise in interviews with the 
newer DARPA program managers.  A recent study on SBIRs by the National Academy of 
Sciences also suggests that this focus may have shifted (Wessner, 2007).  In particular, the study 
shows that while small businesses receiving government funding are good at achieving mission 
goals, they are frequently not successful at surviving in the long-term or at technology 
commercialization (Wessner, 2007). 
 
7. Conclusions 
With the decline of corporate R&D labs and the vertical fragmentation of industries, firms today 
face new challenges in establishing appropriate sources of new inventions and in coordinating 
subsequent technology development across the myriad of affected firms.  Recent research has 
documented challenges in the coordination across firms in advancing technology platforms 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti and Levien, 2004), in aligning incentive structures across 
interdependent firms (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 2005), and in supporting long-term 
research within such ecosystems. Little research, however, has explored the role for government, 
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if any, in aiding the coordination necessary across these firms, as well as between established 
firms, start-ups, and academic actors so as to sustain long-term technology development. 
 
The computing industry provides a classic example of an industry supported with government 
funding and characteristic of the above-described changes in the innovation and industrial 
ecosystems over the past sixty years.  Three changes have been particularly striking in the 
computing industry.  First, the computing industry has been particularly representative of the 
decline of corporate R&D labs, and the shift to a vertically fragmented industry structure.  
Second, at the same time as this shift in innovation locus and industry structure, the computing 
industry has also matured and experiences a shift in market demand.  Specifically, whereas in the 
early years, primary demand for computing capabilities was from government contractors, today 
the primary demand for computing products is from high-volume commercial applications.  As a 
consequence, whereas in the past the military ordered customized products from commercial 
vendors, today the military must add custom additions to commercial products.  Along with these 
changes in the structure of the industry, the industry locus of innovation and the industry locus of 
demand, has been a dramatic change in the sources and structure of government funding of the 
computing industry, particularly within DARPA.  Together, these dramatic changes in the 
computing innovation ecosystem and, later, in the structure of one of the most successful funders 
of innovation within that ecosystem beg for further empirical study to understand the processes, 
(1) by which an organization can go through such a change, and (2) by which the State may 
influence technology development in this new environment. 
 
To this end, this study unpacks the institutional environment and corresponding processes by 
which DARPA program managers seed and encourages new technology trajectories within the 
U.S. innovation ecosystem.  The study focuses on the recent shift within DARPA under the 
directorship of Tony Tether.  In addressing this challenge, this study breaks its analysis of 
DARPA into two sections – one evaluating the processes used by DARPA under the previous 
three directors (1992-2000), and the second evaluating the processes used by DARPA beginning 
with Tether (2001-2008).  What is perhaps most remarkable about the results is that despite 
significant changes over the past seven years in the degree of autonomy of program managers, 
the way that project funding is structured, and the even the stated goal at DARPA the underlying 
processes by which DARPA program managers act to seed and encourage new technology 
trajectories has remained broadly the same.   
 
What has changed, however, is the situations to which program managers apply these processes.  
Specifically, prior to 2001, DARPA’s processes for seeding and encouraging new technology 
trajectories involved (1) bringing star scientists largely from academia together to brainstorm 
new ideas, (2) gain momentum around these ideas by seeding disparate researchers, (3) 
encourage early knowledge-sharing between star researchers through workshops, and (4) 
providing third-party validation for new technology directions to external funding agencies and 
industry.  These process provided a critical function in supporting the sources of, knowledge 
flows around, and development of social networks necessary for gaining momentum around new 
technology developments.  In contrast, since 2001, the DARPA program manager’s processes for 
gaining momentum around new ideas involve (1) orchestrating the involvement of established 
vendors with academics and start-ups, (2) supporting knowledge-sharing between industry 
competitors through invite-only workshops, (3) providing third-party validation of new 
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technology directions, and (4) supporting technology platform leadership at the system level.  
These new process may be providing a critical function in supporting the coordination of 
technology development within industry across a vertically fragmented firm ecosystem while 
keeping in mind longer-term commercial and military goals. 
 
Missing, however, from this story is what has moved in to fill the function originally played by 
DARPA prior to it’s self-proclaimed focus on “Bridging the Gap” since 2003.  One DARPA 
program manager from the 1990s, when asked about the role of DARPA in funding technologies 
to support Moore’s Law, stated of his time at DARPA, 
 
We never state it publicly, but … I want to fund those companies that will put Intel out of 
business.  I’m not interested in driving Moore’s Law. The ITRS roadmap exists, and everyone 
knows what it is.  DARPA is not in the business of maintaining that roadmap.  We’re in the 
business of cutting a path across it. 
 
With the government needing to customize components produced in industry, and putting control 
of projects in the hands of system contractors, this program manager’s perspective seems far 
from being true still today.  
 
Finally, in seeking to inform science policy, the leaders of DARPA, and the leaders of other 
State organizations based on DARPA, the most important indicator of the success of DARPA 
and its program managers may be the structure, diversity, and content of their social networks.  
Specifically, who is in their advisory committees helping identify directions, who is in the 
program manager’s network out of which they are seeding and gaining momentum around new 
ideas, with whom are they building community, with which communities do they at a given time 
hold the clout to validate directions and whom do they have to involve to hold that clout, and to 
whom are they transitioning the technology.
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Appendix 1: The Changing Faces of DARPA 
 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was founded under President Eisenhower in 
February1958 by Public Law 85-325 and Department of Defense Directive 5105.41, as a direct 
consequence to the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957 (NRC, 1999).  Initially, ARPA was 
charged with preventing technological surprises such as Sputnik.  Many blamed the advent of 
Sputnik on the rivalry at the time between the military services, and ARPA was set up to cut 
through that rivalry.  After its founding, ARPA’s first priority was to oversee space activities 
until NASA was up and running and to screen new technological possibilities, shutting down 
those without merit (Roland, 2002). By 1960, all of ARPAs civilian programs were transferred to 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and all of its military space 
programs were transferred to the individual Services.  At this point, ARPA was forced to face the 
question of its longer-term role.  President Eisenhower had always insisted that the Cold War 
was fundamentally a contest between two economic systems, and that it would be won or lost 
economically, not militarily (Roland, 2002).  This perspective, in which the distinction between 
military and civilian technology was blurred, would stay with ARPA throughout the 1960s. 
 
With space activity oversight behind it, ARPA focused its energies on ballistic missile defense, 
nuclear test detection, propellants, and materials (NRC, 1999). It was at this time that ARPA 
took on the role of bringing along ideas that other segments of the nation would not or could not 
develop, and carrying them to proof-of-concept (Roland, 2002). ARPA’s goal was then to 
transition the technology out of the laboratory into the hands of users or producers who should 
bring it to full adoption and exploitation (Roland, 2002). ARPA’s independent status not only 
insulated it from established service interests, but also tended to foster radical ideas and keep the 
agency tuned to basic research questions (NRC, 1999).  When the agency-supported work 
became too much like systems development, it ran the risk of treading on the territory of a 
specific service (NRC, 1999).  ARPA also established in the 1960s its critical organizational 
infrastructure and management style: a small high-quality managerial staff, supported by 
scientists and engineers on rotation from industry and academia, successfully employing existing 
DOD laboratories and contracting procedures (rather that creating its own research facilities), to 
build solid programs in new, complex fields (Barber Associates, 1975; NRC, 1999).  Finally, 
according to NAS, ARPA emerged as an agency extremely sensitive to the personality and 
vision of its director (NRC, 1999). 
 
Following Army Brigadeier General Autin Betts6, Jack Ruina took the office as DARPA’s 
director in 1961 at the same time as Kennedy and MacNamara took office.  As director, Ruina 
cemented the agency’s reputation as an elite, scientifically respected institution devoted to basic, 
long-term research projects.  Ruina believed independence and intellectual quality were critical 
to attracting the best people, both to ARPA as an organization and to ARPA-sponsored projects 
(Barber Associates, 1975; NRC, 1999). A Doctor of Electrical Engineering and professor at the 
time of his leave at the University of Illinois, he also valued scientific and technical merit above 
immediate relevance to the military (MIT website) (NRC, 1999). During his tenure, Ruina 
decentralized management at ARPA, and began the tradition of relying heavily on independent 
office directors and program managers to run research programs. To meet his goals for the 
                                                
6 Betts, the second ARPA director, had suffered under the perception within the Pentagon that he favored his own 
service.  On his recommendation, all subsequent ARPA/DARPA directors have been civilians. (Roland, 2002 #418) 
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agency, Ruina encouraged creative use of existing Department of Defense managerial 
mechanisms including “no-year money,” unsolicited proposals, sole-source procurement, and 
multi-year forward funding. (NRC, 1999) 
 
During the 1970s, the war in Vietnam became the driving force, tending to redirect research 
towards military purposes and raising concerns about the effect of defense funding on university 
research.  In 1969 Richard Nixon became the 37th president of the United States.  The Nixon 
administration pushed for more directed research programs in computer science that addressed 
specific national problems, rather than letting the research community have most of the role in 
defining research directions (NRC, 1999).  In 1969 Congress forbade military funding for any 
research that did not have a “direct or apparent relationship to a specific military function or 
operations” (NRC, 1999).  The legislation, which was enacted into law as the Mansfield 
Amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 1970 (Public Law 19-121), was short-lived, but 
had the longer-term impact of shortening the time horizons for government research support in 
general and defense research in particular (NRC, 1999). 
 
Following the changes in the political climate, ARPA’s name was officially changed to DARPA 
(the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) in 1972.  In 1975 George Heilmeier became 
director of DARPA, and brought an emphasis on applications and a more formalized 
management style (NRC, 1999).  Under Heilmeier’s directorship, all proposals needed to address 
six questions: (1) what are the limitations of current practice, (2) what is the current state of 
technology, (3) what is new about these ideas, (4) what would be the measure of success, (5) 
what are the milestones and the “mid-term exams, and (5) how will I know you are making 
progress.  In contrast to Ruina, Heilmeier led with a heavy-hand, giving all DARPA orders a 
“wire brushing” to ensure that they had concrete “deliverables” and “milestones” (Roland, 2002).  
In short, Heilmeier viewed DARPA as a mission agency, whose goal was to fund research that 
directly supported the mission of the DOD (Roland, 2002). Attempts to transition some of the 
IPTO paper studies to applications brought an infusion of 6.2, or Exploratory Development, 
funding to the IPTO in the early 1970s.  Heilmeier accelerated that trend, flipping the 
distribution of basic-to-applied research funding from 60-40 to 42-58 during his tenure, while 
holding the total IPTO budget stagnant.  While Robert Kahn had no difficulty justifying his 
networking projects to Heilmeier, artificial intelligence fared less well, and Heilmeier, by his 
own account, sent the AI community – which was at the time focused on more basic research – 
into turmoil (NRC, 1999). 
 
In the 1980s, fears were raised that the microelectronics and computer industries seemed to be 
going the way of the auto industry – to Japan, and defense concerns gave way to industrial 
competitiveness as the primary driver of research policy.  These fears were not unfounded.  
During the 1980s, the U.S. semiconductor industry’s share of the global market fell from 75 to 
40 percent (Alic et al., 1992).  By the end of the 80’s Japanese semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment suppliers were gaining market share at a rate of 3.1 percentage points a year, and u.S. 
semiconductor manufacturers planned to purchase the majority of their equipment from Japanese 
suppliers (NRC, 1999).  Given the heavy-handed role of Japan’s Ministry of Trade and 
International Development in bringing new companies together to cooperate in targeting new 
markets and technologies, there were increasing cries in the U.S. for government action (NRC, 
1999).  Joint ventures, cooperative agreements, university-industry collaborations, and industry 
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consortia all began to emerge during this period to fight what was seen as the Japanese threat 
(NRC, 1999). In January 1983, the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation was 
formed and privately funded by 12 member companies.  In 1984, the National Cooperative 
Research Act exempted research consortia from some antitrust laws and further facilitated 
collaborations.  Perhaps most importantly, in 1987, 14 U.S. semiconductor companies joined a 
not-for-profit venture, SEMATECH, to improve domestic semiconductor manufacturing.  In 
1988, the federal government appropriated $100M annually for the next 5 years to match the 
industrial funding.  With semiconductor manufacturing seen at the time as vital to the defense 
technology base, this money was channeled through DARPA (NRC, 1999). 
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